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This article provides an overview of economic issues pertaining to the costing, pricing, ﬁnancing and
performance of aviation security and an introduction to eight articles contributing to this special issue.
Topics include beneﬁt-cost analysis, production and input relationships, information ﬂows, human fac-
tors and performance measurement, the role of technology, and risk-based security. We highlight
resource allocation and measurement problems that are endemic to aviation security, and analyze the
growing costs of aviation security over the last 15 years. We also provide data and analysis on ﬁnancing
that demonstrates signiﬁcant differences in national approaches to the governance of aviation security
and the economic consequences of such decisions.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
A fundamental problem underlies the provision of aviation se-
curity; how to best allocate scarce resources in order to reduce the
probability of a successful attack against civil aviation to an
acceptable level. The economic concept of scarcity has two
important meanings here. Firstly, resources devoted to defense
activities of any kind (including aviation security) do not directly
increase economic welfare (rather such activities serve to prevent
potential reductions in welfare). When we are forced to expend
resources to protect ourselves we are reducing the resources
available for investment in capital goods and technology and for
production and consumption of goods and services. Secondly, given
a ﬁnite budget allocated to the general activity of national defense,
the resources devoted to aviation security represent a reduction in
resources available to protect non-aviation targets. Moreover, the
resource allocation problem is complicated by the fact that such
decisions are strategic; aviation security risks are not the same as
natural disaster risks. For example, if we decide to allocate more
resources to ensure buildings are earthquake-proof, this does not
change the probability of an earthquake occurring. However, if we
allocate relatively more resources to one aviation security measureGillen), wmorrison@wlu.ca
Ltd. This is an open access article u(and relatively less to another) we change the expected payoffs to
terrorists and thus potentially change the probabilities and modes
of attack.
This article provides an overview of current issues and future
prospects for aviation security from an economic perspective and
introduces the other articles in this special issue. We begin with
some background on aviation security over the last four decades. In
Section 2, we present some data on the costs of aviation security in
Canada and the US and some analysis of the costs of aviation se-
curity at European airports, noting sizable differences across air-
ports even in the same country.1 In Section 3, we discuss difﬁculties
in deﬁning and measuring output and the use of beneﬁt-cost
analysis to aid in resource allocation. We also outline input re-
lationships in the production of aviation security layers and the role
of human factors in the delivery and efﬁciency of aviation security.
Section 4 examines the ﬁnancing of aviation security and the
relationship between ﬁnancing and governance. In Section 5 we
discuss the potential evolution of international security towards a
risk-based system and we offer some brief concluding remarks in
Section 6.1 Much of the data we report focuses on the USA and Canada for the simple
reason that data for other jurisdictions are not consistently available in any form
that permits analysis or comparison. In most cases there needs to be a dramatic
improvement in the collection, transparency, consistency and reporting of data
related to aviation security.
nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Total global air passengers (millions); 1970e2013.
Source: Airlines for America 2
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In the last 45 years, trade, technology, and economic growth
have created an age of globalization in which the welfare of people,
ﬁrms and nations have become ever more interconnected. During
this period, civil aviation has evolved from a heavily regulated
system of national airlines and government operated airports to a
much larger and more competitive global industry inwhich private
airlines and airports compete along with publicly owned counter-
parts and hybrid organizations under diverse regulatory regimes.
Fig. 1 shows the remarkable growth in the number of global air
passengers over the last 43 years, a long-term trendwhich has been
largely impervious to the negative shocks of macroeconomic re-
cessions, health crises, military conﬂicts and acts of terror. In 2013,
approximately 3.1 billion air passengers were transported.
However, civil aviation has been a visible target for acts of
violence and terrorism throughout this period. Fig. 2 shows the
total number of attacks inside planes worldwide by attack type over
the four decades between 1970 and 2009 and indicates the per-
centage of total attacks in each decade accounted for by each attack
type.
In the 1970's, attacks on aircraft were heavily skewed towards
hijackings however this mode of attack has declined both in
number and in relative importance over time. The ﬁgure also
shows a sharp rise in the number of bomb attacks that occurred in
the 1980's falling again in the subsequent decades. The data thus
captures the evolutionary nature of aviation security; as author-
ities implement security measures to nullify a given mode of
attack, terrorists adapt their strategies and the preferred mode of
attack evolves. Overall the total number of attacks has declined
signiﬁcantly over time with 111 attacks in the 1970's but just 21
attacks between 2000 and 2009. In terms of fatalities, there were a
total of 557 deaths as a result of all attacks inside planes in the
1970's. This number rose to 1115 in the 1980's mainly as a result of
a small number of attacks that inﬂicted a large number of2 Airlines for America (2015); data from http://airlines.org/data/annual-results-
world-airlines.casualties, including Air India ﬂight 182 in 1985 (329 fatalities) and
Pan Am ﬂight 103 in 1988 (270 fatalities). In the 1980's the ob-
jectives for attacking aircraft had evolved from attention-seeking
through prolonged live media coverage of a hijacking to the
shock and terror generated by the sudden and unexpected mass
killing of innocent civilians. By the 1990's aviation security had
responded and was evolving into a complex (and expensive) sys-
tem combining intelligence agencies, security personnel at air-
ports and investments in scanning equipment to detect bombs,
weapons and prohibited items. In the 1990's, the total number of
fatalities from all terror attacks inside planes declined to 160, but
the following decade will forever be deﬁned by the 2938 deaths
resulting from the attacks in New York and Washington on
September 11th, 2001. Excluding the 9e11 attacks, there were just
94 fatalities worldwide as a result of terrorist attacks inside aircraft
from 2000 to 2009.
The events of September 11th, 2001 represent by far the biggest
and most shocking realization to date of the ever-evolving threat of
terror attacks against aviation. In particular, the attacks demon-
strated how civilian aircraft could be used as weapons to kill large
numbers of civilians and destroy assets on the ground. The attack
created mass panic over the vulnerabilities of the civil aviation
system and led to sweeping and signiﬁcant changes in the design,
provision and ﬁnancing of aviation security throughout the world.
Since 2001, governments have created new organizations to
implement airport security systems and there have been massive
investments in both technology and the hiring and training of se-
curity personnel. Through all of these changes and increases in
security costs, airports and airlines have faced new challenges in
managing passenger throughput, minimizing delays and negative
passenger experiences resulting from elevated levels of security
effort. The general public and the travelling public have borne both
the direct and indirect economic costs of these investments.2. Costs of aviation security
Unless signiﬁcant changes are made, the monetary and eco-
nomic costs of the current aviation security system are likely to
Fig. 3. : Transportation security administration total expenditures; 2002e2013 ($US millions).
Source: Published budgets of the Department of Homeland Security (2002e2012),6.
Fig. 2. Total worldwide attacks inside aircraft by type of attack; 1970e2009.
Source: Rand Database of Worldwide Terror Incidents.
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ber of air travellers and air cargo continue to grow. The number of
air passengers is predicted to grow at an average annual rate of
between 4.2 and 4.7 percent through to 2033 and approximately
85% of this growth is predicted to occur on our current (2014)
aviation network, By 2030, approximately six billion passengers
annually will require security and screening at airports around the
world.3
A study requisitioned by the European Commission estimates
that in 2002, European total expenditures on aviation security (for
18 member states) totalled V2.8 billion ($2.7 billion US).4 We
estimate that total spending on aviation security by European3 See for example, The Boeing Company (2014) and Airbus (2014, 2011).
4 Irish Airports Authority/Avia Solutions (2004), p113.airports has more than doubled in under 10 years, reaching V5.7
billion ($7.6 billion US) in 2011.5 A more complete picture of the
trend in aviation security expenditures is available for the U.S. and
Canada. Fig. 3 shows U.S. government funding of the Trans-
portation Security Agency (TSA) has increased signiﬁcantly since
its inception, growing from $2.2 billion in 2002 to almost $8
billion in 2013.
Fig. 4 shows the trend of expenditures in Canada over the same
period, where spending by the Canadian Air Transport Security
Authority (CATSA) increased in much the same pattern but peaking5 We use data on operating expenses for 75 European airports in 2011 (ATRS
airport benchmarking data) and an estimate of average aviation security costs at
20% of total airport operating costs in 2012, as reported by Airports Council Inter-
national; https://www.aci-europe.org/policy/fast-facts.html.
6 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2002e2014).
Fig. 5. Comparing TSA and CATSA total expenditures per capita ($US); 2005e2014.
Sources: US Census; Statistics Canada; Department of Homeland Security; CATSA.
Fig. 4. Total CATSA (Canada) expenditures ($US); 2002e2013.
Source: CATSA annual reports (2003e2014); Bank of Canada.
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size of the U.S. and Canada make comparisons of absolute spending
unenlightening, consequently, Figs. 5 and 6 show spending on
aviation security per capita and per screened passenger in the two
countries from 2005 to 2014. Fig. 5 reveals a signiﬁcant difference
between the two countries in terms of spending per capita, with
the U.S. spending on average $9.92US more per capita that Canada
over the ten-year period.
Fig. 6 also shows the U.S. spending more than Canada per
screened passenger although the difference is much smaller,
driven by the fact that the number of air passengers in the U.S.
(relative to the population) is much larger than in Canada. The
mirrored spike in expenditures for 2009 reﬂects different re-
sponses to the ﬁnancial crisis and recession in the two countries.While passenger volumes declined in both Canada and the US
(reducing revenues from aviation security charges), spending per
screened passenger rose in the U.S. but declined in Canada. Part
of the explanation lies in differences in how aviation security is
ﬁnanced in the two countries. We discuss this further in
Section 4.
Although there is limited country level data available, we have
attempted to analyze how costs change with changes in the total
number of passengers served (aggregate at the country level). We
investigate two costs; (a) total operating plus capital costs and (b)
passenger screening and bag check costs. The former employs data
from Canada, U.S. and Australia and the latter uses data from
Canada, U.S. and New Zealand. All costs are in real terms and
expressed in Canadian dollars.
Table 1
Regression of total operating plus capital expenses by country.
Dep Variable: Total cost (operating &capital expenses)
Observations: 30
Linear
Coeff. t-stat
Intercept 977746.53 2.26
US 2550111.73 0.46
Australia 338973.79 0.87
Passengers 11.79 1.44
Time 167301.43 3.06
R SQ 0.96
F-statistic 90.81
Table 2
Regression of passenger screening & boarding costs by country.
Dep. Variable: Passenger boarding and screening costs
Observations: 30
Linear
Coeff. t-stat
Intercept 780375.0384 3.79
US 2269669.527 0.86
New Zealand 71298.54 0.38
Passengers 9.56 2.46
Time 73758.85 2.84
R SQ 0.98
F-statistic 216.53
Fig. 6. TSA and CATSA total expenditures per screened passenger7; ($US); 2005e2014.
Sources: Department of Homeland Security, TSA Blog: Year in Review, Federal Aviation Administration, CATSA.
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expenses, with total cost as the dependent variable.8 Neither
country dummy variable is signiﬁcant, meaning there is no differ-
ence in costs between Canada, U.S. and Australia that would be7 For the US, the number of screened passengers is estimated from enplanement
data for all years except 2013 and 2014. In 2013, 2014 TSA published the total
number of screened passengers in their ‘year in review’. We estimate the number of
screened passengers by applying the ratio of screened passengers to total
enplanements in 2013 to total enplanement data for all the other years.
8 This model was estimated using both linear and logelog speciﬁcations. The
linear model was superiod in ﬁt.explained by some other variables or that are inherent to those
respective countries. The incremental cost of serving a passenger is
$11.79 and costs have been increasing over time as indicated by the
positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the time variable.9 Evaluating
the elasticity of total cost with respect to changes in the number of
screened passengers at the mean, gives an elasticity of 0.96 which
implies very slight cost economies.
In Table 2, the same variables as used in the regressions reported
in Table 1 were regressed on total passenger screening and baggage
costs. Three countries were included in the data set e Canada, U.S.
and New Zealand. In Table 2, neither of the country dummy vari-
ables are signiﬁcant, while passenger-screening costs in real terms
are increasing over time. The incremental cost of serving a pas-
senger is $9.56 (CAN). Evaluating the elasticity of passenger and
screening costs at the mean yields a value of 0.536; a 1 percent
increase in screened passengers increases boarding and screening
costs by 0.536 percent. This value indicates signiﬁcant cost econ-
omies, which is reasonable given that a ﬁxed team of screeners can
process an increasing number of passengers before having to add
another screening team.
Europe has a different model to fund and provide aviation se-
curity whereby National governments set security standards and
each airport in a country (or member state) provides the security
services (either through producing it themselves or contracting
out) and levies a charge on airlines and/or passengers.10 Although
data is limited, wewere able to construct measures of security costs
for a sample of airports. In Fig. 7 average security cost per passenger
varies from $6.28 at Saltsburg Airport, Austria to $0.73 at Sabiha
Gokcen Airport in Istanbul. The average cost for all airports in the
sample was $2.88 per passenger. These numbers will be somewhat
distorted if transfer passengers are not screenedwhen they connect
and there will be some expenses for screening cargo and to the
extent an airport handles a signiﬁcant amount of cargo, this will
upward bias the averages. To correct for these possible biases we9 Time could have also been speciﬁed as a dummy for each year. However, there
were too few observations to allow for this.
10 Aviation Security in the European Union is set out in EC Regulation No. 300/
2008) which came into ﬂl effect April 29, 2010.
Fig. 7. Security cost per passenger; European airports; 2011 ($US).
Source: ATRS airport benchmarking data (2011); author's calculations.
Table 3
Regression of total security cost for sample of EU airports.
Dependent Variable: Total security cost sample: (Adjusted) 1, 57
Linear Log-linear
Variable Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic
Constant 2582748 0.11 1.055 1.17
Passengers 2.59 6.60 0.940 14.92
Gateway dummy 11805108 0.49 0.254 0.98
Large hub dummy 46353938 2.34 0.468 2.00
Percent international 3270769 0.15 0.106 0.57
Cargo 36.33 3.29 0.094 2.96
UK 3108878 0.19 0.101 0.50
Germany 782348 0.48 0.233 1.07
Netherlands ¡54988685 2.04 0.191 0.57
France 4100851 0.22 0.012 0.05
Spain ¡35316021 2.00 ¡0.463 2.19
Portugal 22496096 0.91 ¡0.611 1.95
Turkey ¡57742523 2.48 ¡1.060 3.52
Norway 37106233 1.19 0.303 0.76
Austria 19758673 0.97 0.606 2.35
Switzerland 2920647 0.13 0.149 0.54
Italy 9090521 0.55 0.123 0.57
Sweden 5395703 0.21 0.092 0.29
Finland 4548366 0.18 0.121 0.38
Denmark 20143385 0.80 0.317 0.99
Hungry 5234784 0.26 0.202 0.79
Greece 10445515 0.41 0.213 0.67
Poland 4349492 0.21 0.004 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.95 0.96
Log likelihood 1025.32 13.09
F-statistic 31.11 42.28
11 A 1 percent increase in cargo tonnes leads to a 0.09 percent increase in costs.
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national passengers, whether the airport was a large hub and/or
gateway and dummy variables were used to examine differences
across countries. The results are reported in Table 3. The regressionestimated is speciﬁed as:
Security Cost ¼ g(passengers (#), cargo (tonnes), percent inter-
national passengers, Large Hub Dummy, Gateway Dummy, Country
Dummies (UK, Germany, Netherlands, France, Spain, Portugal,
Turkey, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Finland,
Denmark, Hungry, Greece and Poland).
Table 3 presents the results of two regression speciﬁcations
(linear and logarithmic) with statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients
indicated in bold. The results of the two speciﬁcations are quite
similar. The marginal cost per passenger is $2.59; substantially
less than the previous regression that included data for U.S.,
Canada and Australia. However, the elasticity of cost with respect
to passengers is estimated to be 0.94, a similar ﬁgure to what was
estimated earlier. Security costs are higher for large hubs and not
surprisingly, cargo adds $36.33 per tonne to security costs, with an
elasticity of 0.09.11 The proportion of international passengers
does not seem to affect overall security costs in the EU. This is
somewhat surprising given the large connecting hubs of Frank-
furt, Munich, Charles de Gaulle, Amsterdam (Schiphol) and Lon-
don Heathrow. However, all trafﬁc between Schengen member
states is considered domestic trafﬁc. Spain, Portugal and Turkey
have lower security costs on average and Austria has higher costs,
otherwise there are no signiﬁcant cost differences among EU
member states.2.1. Air cargo
Air cargo includes hold-checked baggage of passengers travel-
ling on a ﬂight, belly hold air freight travelling on a passenger
aircraft and freight travelling on dedicated air freighter aircraft.
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screening.
Checked luggage is passed through machines that can detect
certain materials, liquids, explosives and identify objects that could
be a threat. In the early 2000s when there were not enough ma-
chines to screen checked baggage there was a positive bag match
program put in place. This required that any bag on a ﬂight had to
match with a corresponding passenger on that ﬂight. This program
has evolved such that a passenger cannot have control of their
checked luggage. All checked luggage is screened butmay be placed
on an earlier or later ﬂight, the passenger whose bag it is, does not
know this. On long haul ﬂights for all intents and purposes, checked
baggage and passengers match.
There is a large dedicated air freighter ﬂeet; air freighters move
72% of airfreight from SE Asia to Europe and carry 80% of trans-
paciﬁc and 43% of trans-Atlantic air freight.12 Screening of air
freight in some respects is easier than screening passengers, with
less stochastic demand and 100 percent use of technology. How-
ever, implementing the screening cargo in belly hold of aircraft has
taken longer than passenger screening. There are a number of
difﬁculties. For example, it is not feasible to screen air freight at the
last minute to put on an aircraft since it is in containers or pallet-
ized. The amount and range of screening equipment varies across
airports and some cargo is too large for x-ray equipment. A second,
and serious problem is the varying standards for inspecting air
freight inbound from other countries. This was brought to the fore
in 2012 when terrorists attempted to ship printer tonner cartridges
from Yemen to the U.S. containing explosives.
ICAO has created a set of standards, including screening (where
practicable) for all air freight prior to ﬂight departure.13 A key
component of the program is to have regulated inspectors inspect
air freight and maintaining it in secure premises prior to being
shipped; this is part of the Air Cargo Advance Screening Programme
developed by U.S. Department of Homeland Security. While this
program relies on x-ray and screener inspection for air freight in
belly hold, for larger air freight it relies on signiﬁcant amounts of
advance information concerning the items being shipped including
consignor-shipper, origin freight forwarder, ground handler, carrier,
destination ground handler, destination freight forwarder and
consignee. This approach is a risk based method where more
detailed inspection are carried out on high risk freight/cargo.
In the EU all carriers carrying cargo into the EU from a 3rd
country must apply for an ‘Air Cargo or Mail Carrier Certiﬁcate’
(ACC3). Independent validators for inspecting air freight were to be
trained and positioned in non-EU countries. A program was also
initiated for air cargo advanced screening. Firms would be regis-
tered and have an ‘authorized economic operator’ to carry out se-
curity inspections. This program is similar to the U.S. program,
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The later
program relies on careful and thorough data/information analysis
on air cargo shipments.3. Deﬁning and measuring output in aviation security
Production theory can be utilized to position our thinking
about trade-offs between various inputs in the production of
aviation security services.14 In economics, a production function
describes the technology of production by relating how various
inputs (e.g. labor and capital equipment) are combined to12 See Boeing Air freight Forecast 2014e2015.
13 See, ICAO, Moving Cargo Globally: Air cargo and Mail Secure Supply Chain,
2013.
14 See Coughlin et al. (2002), p22.produce a deﬁnable output. This approach highlights the fact
that within a given technology of production, the same level of
output can be produced using different combinations of inputs.
For example, a given level of aviation security might be obtained
in either a labor intensive or a capital intensive way or via some
balanced combination. The optimal (most efﬁcient) means of
production will depend upon the relative productivity and cost of
each input.
In practice, while measuring inputs and costs are possible,
deﬁning and measuring output is challenging. The output of avia-
tion security is hard to measure because the intended outcome of
all security activities is the mitigation of threats, so what exactly is
produced? Ideally we want to measure the total costs (loss of hu-
man life, destruction of assets etc.) that would have occurred had a
particular security measure or series of security measures not been
in place, but this is not observed. Without a clearly speciﬁed
measure of output, one cannot easily perform beneﬁt-cost analysis,
which is required if we are to efﬁciently allocate resources between
aviation security and other potential activities or if we wish to
allocate resources efﬁciently between competing security mea-
sures. Consider a project, which requires some initial investment of
funds in year 0 and continued funding each year for the life of the
project until the project ends in year T. The project will yield a
stream of economic beneﬁts and costs given by:
V ¼
XT
t¼0
Bt  Ct
ð1þ rÞt (1)
where Bt and Ct are the beneﬁts and costs realized in period t and r
is the rate of interest (discount rate) in a competitive capital mar-
ket. Applying the logic of beneﬁt-cost analysis to aviation security,
for a given security measure we want to re-interpret Bt as:
Bt ¼

pt;s  pt;s

kt (2)
In (2) pt,s represents the probability of attacks in year t without
the implementation of the security measure and pt,s represents the
(reduced) probability of attacks in year t after the implementation
of the security measure. Variable k represents the value of lives and
assets expected to be destroyed in successful attacks annually. As
already stated, these probabilities can only be conjectured from
historical evidence and intelligence. Nevertheless in spite of these
difﬁculties, it is possible for beneﬁt-cost analysis to generate in-
sights in support of improved resource allocation decisions,
providing we are able to make certain informed assumptions about
the risk reductions associated with any given security measure.
Stewart and Mueller (2008) use such an approach to assess speciﬁc
aviation security measures in the U.S. in the aftermath of the
September 11th attacks. A key element in their approach is the use
of sensitivity analysis to provide the ranges of probabilities required
for a given security measure to generate net beneﬁts. This step is
essential as a robustness check on the reliability of the estimates. In
the ﬁrst article in this special issue, Christopher Stewart and John
Mueller extend their research to evaluate the PreCheck (trusted
traveller) program in the US. Their analysis calculates the beneﬁts
of the current US aviation security system with and without the
PreCheck program. They show that under very conservative as-
sumptions (concerning the ability of a trusted traveler system to
detect terrorists and the overall probability that any citizen is a
terrorist) that the net effect of the PreCheck program is to generate
beneﬁts and efﬁciencies while likely improving the overall level of
security.
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Productive efﬁciency (measured by the cost of producing a given
level of output, holding quality ﬁxed) can vary depending on how
labor effort is combined with various capital inputs. In the realm of
aviation security, the ways that capital assets embodying new
technology interact with human labor effort have very real and
important implications for the overall level of security provided
and for efﬁciency. In the second article in this issue, Paul Benda
brings his years of experience in the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security to bear on issues relating to the current and future role of
technology in aviation security. In his commentary article, Mr.
Benda argues that technology has the potential to not only improve
the level of security but also to improve efﬁciency and provide
passengers with a better air travel experience. He emphasizes the
importance of upgradeable technologies and suggests that in
future, technology will enable more centralization and conse-
quently can increase the productivity of airport screening, which
implies changes to way security personnel are currently employed.
To take advantage of technology improvements, the institutions
governing the provision of aviation security need to be ﬂexible
enough to not only adopt new technologies but to make necessary
changes in the mix of inputs. New technologies (biometrics for
example) offer the potential to change the way that aviation se-
curity is provided, however the adoption of such technologies is
also problematic because of the limitations in our ability to mea-
sure output. To the extent that the adoption of a new technology
implies a different set or combination of inputs thanwas used in the
past, policy-makers and those overseeing the security system face a
difﬁcult task in assessing the impact. In the absence of counter-
factual evidence, a new technology could be blamed (rightly or
wrongly) for creating vulnerabilities (if a successful attack were to
occur after its implementation, for example), especially if the new
technology replaces elements of the old system. Suchmeasurement
problems create an institutional incentive to only make changes
that add additional layers to the system without reductions in
existing measures. The danger then is that over time, more and
more layers are added without any corresponding reallocation of
resources. Not only will this increase costs over time, but it may also
create inefﬁciencies and suppress the intended beneﬁts of new
technologies.
Our third article in this issue by Brian Jackson and Tom
LaTourette provides an analytical structure for understanding how
different layers of aviation security interact. Jackson and LaTourette
demonstrate how each layer of security can be mapped onto four
general attacker paths. In their analysis, Jackson and LaTourette
introduce the possibility that a new layer of security could place
resource demands on existing layers that lead to reduced or
compromised effectiveness. Importantly, Jackson and LaTourette
assume ‘intelligent adversaries’ who adapt in response to new se-
curity measures. This approach to evaluating layered security lays
open the possibility of more detailed cost-beneﬁt analysis of se-
curity measures and provides a framework to facilitate the possible
removal or scaling down of existing security layers as new layers
and technologies are adopted. This is an essential step if aviation
security costs are to be kept under control as the system evolves.
The traditional neoclassical production function in economics is
silent on matters pertaining to organizational structure and human
behavior; and yet these factors can be critical in aviation security.
Assessing security risks through the screening of passengers in-
volves human interaction and communication not only between
passengers and screening agents, but also between the various
groups involved in the overall security process. In our fourth article,
Alan Kirschenbaum presents a view of airports as complex service
organizations with a mix of formal and informal organizationalstructures and information ﬂows. In particular he highlights the
importance of social networks and the evolution of informal
communication channels and decision-making processes. Dr. Kir-
schenbaum's study of European airports provides data on how
security and screening decisions are actually made and the ﬂow of
information around those decisions. The results indicate that se-
curity personnel do not behave the way they might be expected to
in a theoretical representation of their organization and its formal
processes. Furthermore his study suggests that in contrast to the
traditional view of passengers as “passive cogs” in security process,
passengers interact with screening personnel and this has impor-
tant implications for screening time.
The ﬁfth paper in this issue also explores human factors in the
area of passenger baggage screening. In an operations-focused
approach Jacek Skorupski develops a model and a computer sys-
tem capable of taking human factors into account in the screening
process. His model incorporates subjective dependencies into the
decision-making process by employing a fuzzy inference system
with parameters based on a combination of expert opinion and
ﬁeld research at Katowice-Pyrzowice airport. Dr. Skorupski argues
that such modelling can be used to evaluate security screening
agents and to improve the structure of training programs to opti-
mize performance and improve efﬁciency.
4. Aviation security ﬁnancing
The ﬁnancing of aviation security post-2001 has not happened
in a uniform way around the world and in particular is tied to a
variety of different nation-speciﬁc governance structures. Unfor-
tunately there is little to no transparency concerning exactly how
much national governments are spending on aviation security from
general tax revenues and how much air travellers and airlines are
paying for aviation security through earmarked taxes and charges.
While some data on delineated security charges is available for
some countries (Germany, Italy, Spain for example), there is no way
to ascertain if these published charges represent total ﬁnancing. In
countries with government run airports (China for example) gov-
ernment ﬁnancing likely exceeds revenues from published security
taxes, which are set relatively low. Meanwhile in countries with
privately owned airports (the UK and Australia for example) indi-
vidual airports do not publish delineated aviation security charges
levied on airlines and passengers but instead publish ‘passenger
service charges’ which encompass a number of different services,
one of which is aviation security. In these cases it is also unclear
how much (if any) government expenditures cross-subsidize some
aspects of aviation security. For this reason, below we only report
data from Canada and the U.S. where more accurate data is avail-
able. However this two-country comparison is sufﬁcient to
demonstrate two very different approaches to the ﬁnancing of
aviation security.
The governments of the U.S. and Canada both reacted very
quickly to the September 11th attacks but in different ways. The U.S.
elected for a model in which one large federal government
department (the TSA) would take over all aspects of aviation se-
curity including oversight of security standards at airports, testing
and adoption of new security technologies and the training and
provision of screening personnel across America's airports. Corre-
spondingly, a large proportion of the costs of aviation security in
the U.S. have been ﬁnanced out of general tax revenues with the
remainder provided via revenues from a security tax levied on air
travellers. In 2001, the government introduced the September 11th
security fee, which was set at $2.50 per enplanement per passenger
per one-way trip, up to a maximum of $5. There was also an avia-
tion security infrastructure fee which is a fee levied on air carriers
equal to the cost for passenger and baggage screening in the year
Fig. 8. TSA total expenditures, revenues from security charges and imputed government spending on aviation security; 2005e2014.
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Million.
In Canada, the model was different. The federal government
created the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CASA) as an
independent agency with a mandate to test and implement new
security technologies and to oversee the training and standards of
security personnel. Unlike the U.S., under the Canadian model, se-
curity personnel are supplied by private market ﬁrms. The Cana-
dian government instituted its own federal tax on air passengers;
the ‘air travellers' security charge’ (ATSC) however in contrast to the
U.S., the tax was intended to cover all of CATSA's expenditures (with
no additional spending coming from general tax revenues). Thus
the relative ﬁnancial burden facing air passengers versus all citizens
in Canada is very different than in the U.S.
Fig. 8 shows a breakdown of total expenditures for the period
2005e2014 by the TSA. One can see that the revenues collected via
the September 11th security fee has remained relatively ﬂat over
the period. Given an increase in spending following the ﬁnancial
crisis and recession in 2008, government spending increased
accordingly. One can see a decline in total and government
spending in 2014 and a slight rise in the revenues collected from
the security fee. In 2014, the U.S. government increased the
September 11th charge to a ﬂat fee of $5.60 (regardless of the
number of enplanements) per one-way-trip. Furthermore, in the
proposed 2014 budget by the Obama Administration, the plan is to
increase the September 11th security fee by approximately 50 cents
each year until 2019.15 Thus while the U.S. has opted for a blend of
user-pay and citizens-pay in the ﬁnancing of aviation security, the
blend is changing with relatively more burden in the foreseeable
future being placed on air travellers.
Fig. 9 displays a similar breakdown for Canada over the same
period. While the ﬁgure only shows data from 2005 to 2014, total
revenues from the ATSC exceeded CATSA expenditures both prior to
2007 and after 2011. Part of the explanation derives from capital
spending which began to increase steadily in 2004 so that by 2007,
total spending was greater than total revenues from the ATSC. The
effects of the ﬁnancial crisis and recession, dampened ATSC15 See House of Representatives Committee on the Budget (2013).revenues in the face of these higher capital costs and this led the
federal government to increase the ATSC in 2010. These rate in-
creases were signiﬁcant, with the domestic fee per chargeable
enplanement doubling from $4.67 CAN (maximum charge of $9.33)
to $7.12 CAN (maximum charge of $14.25). The ATSC for transb-
order passengers increased from $7.94 CAN per chargeable
enplanement (maximum charge of $15.89) to $12.10 CAN
(maximum charge of $24.21). Finally, the ATSC for international
passengers increased from $17 CAN to $25.91 CAN. These increases
in ATSC rates combined with the slow but steady recovery of the
macro economy and air passenger trafﬁc has caused ATSC revenues
to increase dramatically in the last few years, while capital
spending and variable costs have declined.
Thus the current trend shows growing annual surpluses, which
simply revert to become general revenues for the federal
government.
Using 2011 data, Gillen and Morrison (2015), estimate the wel-
fare loss in Canada due to the imposition of security fees for that
year.16 According to these estimates, in 2011 there were 690,000
fewer passengers ﬂying to/from and within Canada as a result of
the air transport security charge. This translates into $227Million in
forgone revenue to the airlines and an economicwelfare loss of $2.2
Billion.17
Fig. 10 illustrates the signiﬁcant differences in revenue per
passenger from security fees. Per passenger revenue for Canada is
climbing at an alarming rate while for other countries revenue per
passenger is leveling off. The U.S. collects the lowest amount and
despite recent increases in passenger security charges there, re-
mains well below other countries.
The issue of who should pay for aviation security is a funda-
mental economic question and one that rests to a large extent on
who we think beneﬁts from aviation security. In the sixth article in
this special issue, Barry Prentice reviews the economic arguments
for and against a ‘user pay’ versus an ‘everyone pays’ approach. He
argues that many of the beneﬁts of airport security accrue to the16 See, David Gillen andWilliam Morrison (2015), Issue in Aviation Security (paper
presented at the Canadian Economics Association Meeting, Toronto).
17 This does not include other relevant indirect losses to passengers and airlines
from delays, inconvenience and declines in economic activity.
Fig. 9. CATSA total expenditures, revenues from security charges and imputed government spending on aviation security ($US); 2005e2014.
Fig. 10. Revenue per passenger from security fees; international comparison.
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similar to national defense. Dr. Prentice's assessment of the Cana-
da's ‘user pay’ approach is that it is discriminatory, distortionary
and ultimately self-defeating.5. The evolution to risk-based aviation security
Until very recently, the aviation security system has operated on
the assumption that each and every passenger at an airport is a
potential terrorist until shown to be otherwise. Under this
approach, all passengers receive the same degree of screening and
attention as they pass through security checkpoints. The result has
been the line-ups and delays that are now a reality of air travel. Inrecent years however, there has been growing support for adopting
risk-based aviation security measures, including the creation of
trusted traveller programs. In a risk-based security system, pas-
sengers are divided into risk categories with a potentially large
segment of the travelling public classiﬁed as low-risk, thereby
requiring less evasive and less time-consuming screening at the
airport. The institutions and technology supporting this approach
consist of the following main elements:
 Trusted traveller programs: Passengers submit to a pre-
screening process that assesses their risk level. Qualiﬁed in-
dividuals are then eligible for expedited screening procedures at
the airport.
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to random selection for more intense screening at the airport
 Biometrics: Biometric identiﬁcation technology can be utilized
to help ensure that individuals cannot steal or procure the
identity of low-risk trusted travellers.
 Real time behavior assessment: Trained agents at an airport
select passengers for more intense screening if their behavior or
answers to interview questions raise suspicions concerning
their risk level.
 Real time intelligence and information: Intelligence authorities
with information on changes in a person's risk-status convey
that information in a timely manner to security personnel at the
airport.
The combined effects of these elements offers the possibility of
maintaining or enhancing security levels while reducing wait times
and delays for passengers, however there are many questions to be
answered. How much will a risk-based system cost relative to the
current system? Can a risk-based system be harmonized and
implemented globally? How do we know that a risk-based system
can deliver equivalent or greater security?
International industry associations (notably IATA and ACI) have
been independently developing and promoting risk-based security
for some years now.18 However in 2014, IATA and ACI announced a
memorandum of understanding to harmonize their work and to
jointly promote ‘next generation’ aviation security, with a focus on
“airlineeairport interface, airport throughput capacity and
efﬁciency”.19
Annexes to the agreement are now being ﬁnalized to focus on
the following improvement areas:
 Passenger ﬂow at border crossings based on the Automated
Border Crossing (ABC) project
 Passenger screening processes at targeted security checkpoints
to maximize efﬁciency and productivity, as well as minimize
passenger dissatisfaction
 Gaining support from airports and national regulators to build
on the achievements of the Checkpoint of the Future project
 Airline e airport co-operation on Common Use Self Service
(CUSS)
 Common technical speciﬁcations for data exchange standards at
the airport
 Best practices in ground handling to drive improvements in
safety, productivity and reduce overall risks
 Reducing mishandled bags and offering new products to pas-
sengers, including permanent bag tags and home-printed bag
tags”20
The challenge is to engineer a coordinated international evolu-
tion to risk-based aviation security that preserves international
standards. However such coordination can create prisoners'
dilemma type incentives for each nation to delay implementation
in order to wait and see the outcome of other countries’ adoption of
risk-based measures. So far, there is a lack of data and analysis with
which to measure outcomes, net beneﬁts and net efﬁciency gains,
but both IATA and ACI have begun the process of pilot studies.
In this issue, authors Solomon Wong and Nina Brooks offer an
industry perspective on the need for risk-based security. They point18 IATA named its vision for aviation security “checkpoint of the future”, while ACI
developed a concept it called “better security”.
19 IATA (October 2013); https://www.iata.org/publications/ceo-brief/oct-2013/
Pages/aci-iata-mou.aspx.
20 Ibid.to three key dimensions in the provision of aviation security at
airports: time, stafﬁng and physical space and argue that with the
expected growth in air passengers, solutions must be found to
improve the efﬁciency of airport security. By mapping the top ten
origin-destination passenger ﬂow locations in the world to
geographic risk levels Wong and Brooks demonstrate that a one-
size-ﬁts-all approach to airport security cannot succeed and that
risk-based approaches (along with technology) can allow airports
to customize their security and to accomplish more with fewer
resources.
On the same topic, Robert Poole offers an assessment of the U.S.
experience to date with risk-based assessment approaches to
aviation security. Mr. Poole outlines the evolution of risked-based
assessment in the U.S. and argues that the current PreCheck pro-
gram should implement 3rd party recruitment and should be
expanded to baggage screening. Mr. Poole also argues that the
current governance model in the U.S. is ﬂawed because the Trans-
portation Security Agency (TSA) is both the provider of aviation
security and the regulator. Poole argues for a system similar to that
employed in the UK, where individual airports are responsible for
either providing or contracting out for security screening services.
Poole also concludes that to date, behavioral screening programs in
the US have not been successful.
6. Concluding remarks
In little over a century, our world has changed from a place
where individuals traveled internationally without the need for a
passport and with minimal to no security screening to one inwhich
an ever-increasing amount of productive resources are allocated
(away from other uses) to transportation security and aviation se-
curity in particular. Moreover, security screening amid the potential
for acts of terrorism or other forms of violence against ordinary
citizens has become part of our everyday lives. The research in this
special issue makes a signiﬁcant contribution to answering difﬁcult
questions that nonetheless must be asked. However many avenues
for research remain and our hope is that this issue will spark new
initiatives and discussions on this important topic.
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